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ACCEPTED REVISED PAPER 
 
Protecting Consumer Privacy and Data Security:  
Regulatory Challenges and Potential Future Directions 
 
Stephen Corones* and Juliet Davis** 
 
 
This article considers the regulatory problem of online tracking behaviour, lack of consent to data 
collection, and the security of data collected with or without consent. Since the mid-1990s the US 
Federal Trade Commission has been using its power under the US consumer protection regime to 
regulate these problems.  The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), on the 
other hand, has yet to bring civil or criminal proceedings for online privacy or data security 
breaches, which indicates a reluctance to employ the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) in this field. 
Recent legislative action instead points to a greater application of the specifically targeted laws under 
the Privacy Act, and the powers of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), to 
protect consumer privacy and data security. This article contends that while specific legislation 
setting out, and publicly enforcing, businesses’ legal obligations with respect to online privacy and 
data protection is an appropriate regulatory response, the ACL’s broad, general protections and 
public and/or private enforcement mechanisms also have a role to play in protecting consumer 
privacy and data security.  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the mid-1990s online privacy became a major consumer protection issue in the United States of 
America as a consequence of the development of the Internet and the online environment.1 Since that 
time, the transformation of communications and computer processing power has radically affected 
global commerce. Ecommerce, and ‘apps’ now available on smartphones, tablets and other devices, 
have enabled suppliers of goods and services to collect, store, analyse, and re-sell personal 
information about consumers’ online trading activities. While some of this information is supplied by 
consumers voluntarily, online behaviour tracking is also occurring without the informed consent of 
consumers.  
 
A related problem is the security of this personal information and data, including financial 
information such as credit card details, whether collected with or without consent, from cyberattacks. 
A cyberattack has been defined as: 
…an attempted or actual incident that either: 
(a) uses computer technology or networks to commit or facilitate the commission of 
traditional crimes, such as fraud and forgery – for example, identity or data theft 
(computer assisted); or 
(b) is directed at computers and computer systems or other communication technologies – for 
example, hacking or denial of services (computer integrity).2 
 
                                                            
*BCom, LLB (UQ), LLM (UCL), PhD (UQ); Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of 
Technology. 
**BA, LLB (UQ), MA (Columbia University), MSc (London School of Economics and Political Science).  
1 Timothy J Muris, ‘The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of US Consumer Protection 
Policy’ Paper presented at the Aspen Summit, Cyberspace and the American Dream, Aspen, Colorado, 19 
August 2003, 15-25. Available at: https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/08/federal-trade-commission-
and-future-development-us-consumer-protection. See also Maureen K Ohlhausen and Alexander P Okuliar, 
‘Competition, Consumer Protection, and the Right [Approach] to Privacy’ (2015-2016) 80 Antitrust Law 
Journal 121. 
2 ASIC, ‘Cyber Resilience: Health Check’ (Report 429, ASIC, 2015) 16 [26]. 
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Due to the ubiquitous nature of online transactions, sensitive personal information including financial 
records, health information, and even intimate relationship details, as seen in the 2015 hack of the 
online dating service Ashley Madison, are vulnerable to non-consensual exposure and exploitation. 
The release of this information may cause significant financial and personal costs to the affected 
parties. As such, businesses and consumers are increasingly recognising the need for cyber protection 
of personal information. In 2013, Telstra published its Cyber Security Report 2014, its first annual 
survey aimed at compiling and analysing security event data gathered from Telstra infrastructure and 
security products.3 It also contains the result of an online survey of professionals responsible for 
making IT security decisions within their organisations. According to the report’s authors, 
 
As a sign of growing public interest in digital security, the organisations we surveyed 
perceived reputational damage (22%) as the greatest business risk they faced due to security 
breaches, alongside productivity loss (22%) and financial loss (21%). Loss of sensitive data 
wasn’t far behind at 20 %.4    
 
In March 2015, the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) published a report 
highlighting the importance of cyber resilience and how the risk of cyberattacks and incidents should 
be met in order to meet current legal and compliance obligations in relation to the supply of financial 
products and financial services.5 However it is submitted that current Australian laws protecting 
consumer privacy and data security have struggled to keep up with the exponential transformations 
occurring in the online environment. Additionally, it is argued that the current regulatory regime 
ignores the emerging popularity of self-enforcement mechanisms such as class actions.6 
 
Australia’s current regulatory approach to this issue has been the adoption of the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth), specific legislation setting out specific legal obligations for businesses with respect to online 
privacy and data protection. The Privacy Act, administered by the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (OAIC) establishes economy wide protections and privacy principles for 
the handing of personal information. However it does not contain a private enforcement mechanism, 
preventing victims of online privacy and data breach from directly making a legal claim. In contrast, 
the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) located in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 (Cth) (CCA), does allow for both public and/or private enforcement action. It contains general 
prohibitions that regulate misleading conduct (s 18), and unconscionable conduct (s 21) and also 
contains specific prohibitions regulating false or misleading representations relating to the supply of 
goods or services in trade or commerce. To date the ACL has not served as the basis for either public 
or private proceedings against online privacy or data security breaches. However, a parallel piece of 
consumer legislation in the United States, the Federal Trade Commission Act has empowered its 
regulator, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to deal with the issue of consumer privacy and 
companies’ data security practices.7 By examining the FTC’s approach to regulating the misuse of 
consumer information, this article argues that the Australian consumer protection framework could 
play a role in providing consumer redress against the misuse of online personal data.  
 
The structure of the article is to consider first, in Part II, the nature of the problem and the need for 
regulation to protect consumers in relation to consumer privacy and data security. Next, in Part III, the 
specifically targeted laws under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), and the powers of the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), to protect private data are examined. In Part IV the 
approach of the FTC in using the consumer protection provisions of the Federal Trade Commission 
                                                            
3 Telstra, ‘Cyber Security Report 2014’ (Report, Telstra, 2014). Available at: 
http://www.telstra.com.au/business-enterprise/download/document/telstra-cyber-security-report-2014.pdf 
4 Telstra, above n 3, 30. 
5 ASIC, above n 2. 
6 Morabito, V ‘An Empirical Study of Australia’s Class Action Regimes’ (Report 4, August 2016). 
7 Gina Stevens, ‘The Federal Trade Commission’s Regulation of Data Security under Its Unfair or Deceptive 
Acts or Practices (UDAP) Authority’ (Research Paper, Congressional Research Services, United States 
Congress, 2014), 1. 
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Act as a mechanism for protecting consumer privacy and data security, is considered. In Part V, the 
scope for adopting a similar approach to privacy and data security breaches relying on the broad, 
general protections of the ACL or equivalent provisions of the ASIC Act, is discussed. While the 
general nature of the ACL renders it applicable to a greater number of situations, the importance of 
maintaining the security of financial services necessitates some discussion of the ASIC Act as well. 
Part VI considers the public and private enforcement under the ACL to deal with online privacy and 
data security breaches.  
 
II. ONLINE PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM  
 
In June 2013, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) published a report 
which traced the evolution of the personal data environment, citizens’ attitudes to digital data sharing 
and security, and whether current protection mechanisms were adequate to protect personal data.8 
Amongst the emerging gaps in personal data protection, the ACMA identified ‘…securing an 
individual’s informed consent to the collection and use of their personal information… in an 
environment characterised by increasingly frequent, varied and complex transactions in the digital 
information economy.’9 It also identified ‘…concerns about the security, privacy and management of 
personal information that is stored in cloud services, including services housed in other 
jurisdictions.’10 
 
The free flow of information benefits the economy. Consumers will voluntarily disclose their 
financial information if this will facilitate a transaction. However, consumers are also concerned that 
information that has been collected may be misused in ways that cause them financial loss, for 
example, through the denial of credit based on inaccurate financial information; stolen credit card 
details; and, in extreme cases, identity theft.11 Incidents of computer hacking and cybercrime are on 
the rise. A recent global information security survey found that the total number of cybersecurity 
incidents detected in 2014 was 42.8 million, an increase of 48% from the previous year,12 with the 
global cost of cybercrime reaching $575 billion that year.
13
 The pervasive, yet precarious, nature of 
the online data environment has prompted concerns regarding the misuse of consumer information.  
 
There are a number of different approaches to regulating online privacy and data security.  One 
approach is light-handed self-regulation through so-called ‘fair information practices’ under which 
businesses make use of Privacy Statements and Privacy Notices that give consumers the opportunity 
to opt-out of information sharing. However, this approach can be problematic if consumers do not 
take the trouble to read and understand the Privacy Notice and fail to opt-out. The failure of these 
light-handed approaches means that more sophisticated regulatory approaches are needed to fix the 
problem. 
 
This article examines two distinct forms of regulation which have been applied to the misuse of 
private information in the online data environment. The first regulatory approach is the 
implementation of specific legislation which allows for the public regulation of privacy and data 
security breaches, such as the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The second approach allows for the application 
of general consumer protection legislation which allows for both public and/or private enforcement 
                                                            
8 ACMA, ‘Privacy and Personal Data, Emerging Issues in Media and Communications’ (Occasional Paper 4, 
ACMA, 2013). 15-16 Available at: 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Regulatory%20Frameworks%20and%20International%20Engagement/Inform
ation/pdf/Privacy%20and%20digital%20data%20protection%20Occasional%20paper%204.pdf 
9 Ibid 23.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid 15-16. 
12 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Managing Cyber Risks in an Interconnected World: Key Findings from the Global 
State of Information Security Survey 2015’ (Report, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014) 7. 
13 ‘The Terrorist in the Data: How to Balance Security with Privacy after the Paris Attacks’, The Economist, 28 
November- 4 December 2015, 23. 
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action. Examples of this approach include the US Federal Trade Commission Act, and we argue, the 
ACL and ASIC Act.  
 
So far the authors are not aware of any public or private actions in Australia alleging misleading 
claims by businesses regarding the extent to which they maintain the privacy, security and 
confidentiality of users’ information. One possible reason for the lack of public and private claims is a 
lack of consumer knowledge regarding specific data breaches. In the past, businesses that are the 
subject of a cyberattack have not been obliged to notify the consumers whose personal data has been 
accessed, so that consumers have been unaware that their privacy and personal data may have been 
compromised. However this situation is expected to change due to the proposed implementation of a 
mandatory data breach security regime by way of the Privacy Amendment (Notification of Serious 
Data Breaches) Bill 2015. 
Given the possible increase in consumer awareness of loss or injury caused by online privacy and data 
security breaches, we believe that there is potential for a shift in the enforcement of these breaches 
towards an approach that allows for both public and private enforcement. Regulatory theory asserts 
that social control is maintained via the interplay of public and private enforcement mechanisms.14 
We consider private enforcement in this context to mean the right of individuals and classes of 
persons to attempt to obtain a remedy, including compensation in the form of damages, from a Court 
for injury caused by those infringing the regulatory statute.15 In contrast, public enforcement refers to 
a wide range of actions undertaken by a public agency in an enforcement role, including the 
imposition of fines or injunctions, and the commencement of litigation.16 While public enforcement 
mechanisms may be considered to operate in the broader public interest and provide relief for those 
unable or unwilling to take advantage of private forms of legal remedy, they tend to lend themselves 
less readily to efficiency and effectiveness.17 Private rights of action act as a check on the competence, 
diligence, and honesty of public authorities.18 Where private enforcement mechanisms operate 
effectively there will be less need for intervention by public authorities.19 Additionally, it has been 
argued that: 
Private actions may have a legitimate role in ensuring that those who harm others by their 
unlawful conduct should be legally responsible to those so harmed. The obligation to pay 
damages also serves to punish offenders for unlawful action. If the objectives of 
compensation and punishment are regarded as independent values which should be reflected 
in the law, then entitling private litigants to seek damages can further these subsidiary 
goals…It allows those with a direct sense of grievance a direct opportunity to make 
enforcement claims in court.20 
Furthermore, we assert that a move towards both public and private enforcement of online privacy 
and data security breaches is in line with the steady growth of class actions in Australia facilitated by 
developments in the legal landscape including the acceptance of litigation funding and the expansion 
of plaintiff class action legal firms.21 An examination of over 230 federal data breach lawsuits in the 
United States between 2000 and 2010 found that 76 percent of lawsuits were filed as class actions, 
with claims under the FTC Act constituting one of the top twenty most common causes of action 
                                                            
14 Lennon Chang, Lena Zhong and Peter Grabosky, ‘Citizen Co-production of Cyber Security: Self-help, 
Vigilantes and Cybercrime’ (2016) Regulation and Governance 2. 
15 Karen Yeung, ‘Privatizing Competition Regulation’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 583.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid 587. 
18 Ibid 590. 
19 Chang, above n 14. 
20 Yeung, above n 15, 589. 
21 Allens Linklaters, Class actions in Australia (2015), 1. Available at: 
https://www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/ldr/papldrmay15-01.pdf 
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identified.22 As such, we consider that general consumer protection legislation, such as the ACL and 
ASIC Act, may serve as a useful instrument in the regulation and enforcement of online privacy and 
data security breaches if found to be applicable. In order to determine this question, we will first 
examine how specific privacy legislation deals with breaches of online privacy and data security, 
before considering the application of general consumer protection legislation to these issues in both 
the United States and Australia.  
 
III SPECIFIC PRIVACY LEGISLATION: PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) 
 
 
Currently, in Australia, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), administered by the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (OAIC), regulates the treatment of ‘personal information’ by certain 
government agencies and private entities with over $3 million in turnover. ‘Personal information’ is 
defined in the Privacy Act to mean ‘information or an opinion (including information or an opinion 
forming part of a database and whether or not recorded in material form) about an individual whose 
identity is apparent or can be reasonably ascertained from the information or opinion’.23 Schedule 1 of 
the Privacy Act contains thirteen Australian Privacy Principles (APP) that regulate the treatment of 
personal information by relevant entities.  
 
In relation to the protection of privacy, APP 11 requires regulated agencies and businesses to take 
‘such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances’ to both ‘protect the information from misuse, 
interference and loss, unauthorised access, modification or disclosure’ and ‘to destroy the information 
or to ensure that the information is de-identified’ once its retention is no longer necessary.24 The 
Privacy Act does not provide guidance as to what steps are ‘reasonable in the circumstances’ however 
the Guide to Securing Personal Information released by the OAIC sets out how the OAIC assesses the 
reasonableness of steps when investigating possible breaches of the Privacy Act.25 Circumstances that 
will influence the reasonable steps that should be taken include:  
the nature of [the] entity, the amount and sensitivity of the personal information held, the 
possible adverse consequences for an individual in the case of a breach, the practical 
implications of implementing the security measure, including the time and cost involved, 
[and] whether a security measure is itself privacy invasive.26 
 
In a consumer context, personal information about shoppers is collected by supermarkets through 
their loyalty programs. The OAIC has the power under s 33C(1)(a) of the Privacy Act  to conduct an 
assessment (audit)  to determine whether a private sector entity is complying with the relevant APP. 
In July 2016, the OAIC issued its final reports in relation to audits of Flybuys loyalty program 
conducted by Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd,27 and the Woolworths Rewards loyalty program 
conducted by Woolworths Ltd.28 The assessments were undertaken to determine whether the loyalty 
programs managed personal information in an open and transparent way as required by APP 1, and 
whether they notified individuals of the collection of personal information in accordance with APP 5. 
 
                                                            
22 Sasha Romanosky, ‘Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation’ (2014) 11(1) .Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies 74, 83, 101. 
 
23 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
24 Ibid; Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 11.1-11.2. 
25 Margaret Jackson and Gordon Hughes, Private Life in a Digital World (Thomson Reuters, 2015), 134-135. 
26 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guide to Securing Personal Information, (2015) 12.  
27 Available at: https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/assessments/loyalty-program-assessment-flybuys-coles 
28 Available at: https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/assessments/loyalty-program-assessment-woolworths-
rewards 
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In relation to data security, regulated entities are not obliged to disclose a data breach to either the 
OAIC or to the individuals affected.29 Instead, the OAIC administers a voluntary scheme for reporting 
data breaches.30 However, this voluntary reporting structure seems set to change. The Privacy 
Amendment (Notification of Serious Data Breaches) Bill 2015 (Cth),31 if passed, would require a 
regulated entity to notify both the OAIC and affected individuals following a ‘serious data breach’, 
which is defined as unauthorised access to, or unauthorised disclosure of, personal and certain other 
information that ‘…will result in a real risk of serious harm to any of the individuals to whom the 
information relates…’32 ‘Harm’ for the purposes of this section means physical, psychological, 
emotional, reputational, economic and financial harm.33 In determining whether there is a ‘real risk of 
serious harm to an individual’, a regulated entity may have regard to a number of relevant matters, 
including the type and sensitivity of the information, the nature of the harm, whether the information 
is intelligible to an ordinary person, or could be converted into an intelligible form, the kind of person 
who could obtain the information, and whether steps could be taken to mitigate the harm.34  
 
Failure to notify the OAIC and affected individuals of a serious data breach as soon as practicable will 
be deemed an interference with an individual’s privacy contrary to the Privacy Act and will trigger the 
OAIC’s existing powers under the Privacy Act to ‘investigate…make determinations, seek 
enforceable undertakings and pursue civil penalties for serious or repeated interferences with 
privacy.’35 In addition, the proposed mandatory reporting regime would require an organisation to 
advise affected individuals of the breach either directly, or where this is not practical, by taking 
reasonable steps to publicise the prescribed matters, including by publishing a copy of those 
statements on its website.36  Such publicity may give rise to individual or representative complaints 
under ss 36 and 38 of the Privacy Act.37 Section 52(1)(b) of the Privacy Act provides that after 
investigating a complaint made under the Privacy Act, the Privacy Commissioner may make a 
determination that: 
(ii) the respondent must perform any reasonable act or course of conduct to redress any loss 
or damage suffered by the complainant;  
(iii) the complainant is entitled to a specified amount by way of compensation for any loss or 
damage suffered by reason of the act or practice the subject of the complaint. 
 
IV PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY & CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW: USA 
 
A second approach to the regulation of online privacy and data security is to focus on the harm that 
occurs when information is misused and to impose costs on the companies that misuse consumer 
information in the form of damages under private enforcement, or penalties under public enforcement. 
We are not aware of any instances where this approach has been adopted in Australia, therefore we 
will first consider the experience of the United States, where this approach has been adopted by US 
Federal Trade Commission. The United States, was described by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission as being at the ‘forefront in the development’ of mandatory reporting laws regarding 
data breaches.38  
 
                                                            
29 Australian Government, Mandatory Data Breach Notification, Discussion Paper (2015) 2. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Available at https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/data-breach-notification/Privacy-Amendment-
Notification-of-Serious-Data-Breaches-Bill-2015-December-2015-exposure-draft.pdf 
32 Exposure Draft Privacy Amendment (Notification of Serious Data Breaches) Bill (Cth), s 26WB(2)(a). 
33 Ibid s 26WF. 
34 Ibid s 26WB(3). 
35 Explanatory Memorandum, Exposure Draft Privacy Amendment (Notification of Serious Data Breaches) Bill 
(Cth), 5. 
36 Leif Gamertsfelder, ‘Disclosure Laws and Class Actions: An Irresistible Relationship’ (2016) 5 Governance 
Directions 278. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice’ Report 
108 (May, 2008), 1668 [51.3] available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-108. 
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A  Misleading or Deceptive Acts or Practices 
 
The US Federal Trade Commission is empowered by section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act to ‘prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations’ from using ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce’.39 The FTC has historically tended to use ‘deception’ more than 
‘unfairness’ as a basis for its litigation due to the comparative ease in identifying deceptive practices 
that mislead consumers, rather than those which are unfair.40  
 
According to the three-factor test set out in the FTC’s 1983 Policy Statement on Deception, an act or 
practice is deceptive if it involves:  
(1) ‘a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer’; 
(2) ‘a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances’; and  
(3) the representation, omission, or practice is material to the consumer's choice of or conduct 
regarding a product or services.41 
 
In respect of the first limb of this test, the Commission considers whether the act or practice was 
‘likely to mislead’ the consumer, rather than whether the consumer was actually deceived.42 Actual 
harm to a consumer is not necessary; it is sufficient that a company undertook deceptive acts or 
practices in order for an actionable matter to arise.43  
 
The second limb requires the Commission to employ an objective test to consider, from a reasonable 
consumer’s perspective, whether the consumer’s reaction to, or interpretation of, the practice was 
reasonable.44 This inquiry rests on the specific facts of the matter; and the reasonableness of a 
consumer’s interpretation of an act or omission is presumed if it was the intention of the seller to elicit 
that interpretation.45 If a representation by the seller has multiple meanings for a reasonable consumer, 
the act or omission will still be deemed deceptive provided that one of those meanings is false.46 In 
considering the ‘reasonableness’ of the ordinary consumer’s reaction, the Commission will consider a 
number of factors including ‘the clarity of the representation, whether qualifying information is 
conspicuous, the importance of any omitted information (and whether such information is available 
elsewhere), and the familiarity of the public with the product or service.’47 If a particular consumer 
group is targeted, such as the elderly or children, the Commission will take the perspective ‘of an 
ordinary, reasonable member of that group.’48 The Commission has emphasised that when assessing 
this second factor, the entire course of dealing is subject to evaluation and ‘when the first contact 
between a seller and a buyer occurs through a deceptive practice, the law may be violated even if the 
truth is subsequently made known to the purchaser.’49 This means that ‘[w]ritten disclosures or fine 
print may be insufficient to correct a misleading representation.’50 
 
                                                            
39 Michael D. Scott, ‘The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the 
Commission Gone Too Far?’ (2008) 60(1) Administrative Law Review 129. 
40 G.S. Hans, ‘Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC Enforcement: Broadening Unfairness Regulation for 
a New Era’ (2012) 19 Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review 171. 
41 Federal Trade Commission, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (14 October 1983) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception> 
42 Yan Fang, ‘The Death of the Privacy Policy: Effective Privacy Disclosures after In re Sears’ (2010) 25 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 678. 
43 Eisenhauer, M. The Information Privacy Case Book: A Global Survey of Privacy and Security Enforcement 
Actions with Recommendations for Reducing Risks (International Association of Privacy Professionals, 2008) 
26. 
44 Fang, above n 42. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Hans, above n 40, 170. 
48 Fang, above n 42. 
49 Federal Trade Commission, above n 41. 
50 Ibid. 
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The third limb of this test requires the FTC to determine whether the deceptive representation, 
omission, or practice is ‘material’. The FTC considers a misrepresentation or practice to be ‘material’ 
if it is ‘one which is likely to affect a consumer's choice of or conduct regarding a product’.51 
‘Material’ information must be ‘important’ to consumers and, if omitted or inaccurate, likely to cause 
injury to consumers.52 Certain categories of information are considered by the Commission to be 
‘presumptively material’, such as express and implied claims.53 The Commission has found claims or 
omissions to be material where they ‘significantly involve health, safety, or other areas with which the 
reasonable consumer would be concerned’ or concern ‘the purpose, safety, efficacy, or cost, of the 
product or service.’54 
 
The FTC looks to industry standards in order to determine what constitutes appropriate security 
practices for companies which deal with the personal information of customers and employees.55 It 
has stated that ‘to the extent that strong privacy codes are developed, the Commission will view 
adherence to such codes favourably in connection with its law enforcement work’.56 A number of 
industry groups, such as the Better Business Bureau, have now developed ‘best practice’ standards for 
privacy and data security.57 In September 2014, the National Institutes of Standard and Technology’s 
‘Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity’ was endorsed by the Federal Trade 
Commissioner as ‘fully consistent with the FTC’s enforcement framework.’58   
B  Misleading or Deceptive Acts or Practices Cases 
The FTC’s ‘theory of deception’ includes instances where specific promises to consumers regarding 
data security and privacy have been broken, as well as a ‘general theory of deception’ whereby 
personal consumer information has been obtained or used without adequate disclosure or consent.59 
Some of the FTC’s ‘broken promises’ cases are relatively clear-cut and require minimal interpretation 
to determine a violation, such as where a company breaches its own privacy policy.60  Examples of 
such ‘broken promises’ include promises to keep information confidential, ensure sufficient security 
for personal information, keep consumer identities secret, and refrain from releasing confidential 
information to third parties.61 FTC deception cases have also concerned misrepresentations as to the 
intended use of consumers’ personal information and the failure to adhere to privacy policies with 
third parties.62 
                                                            
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid; Fang, above n 42, 679. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Federal Trade Commission, ‘Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for 
Businesses and Policymakers’ (March 2012) 14. 
<https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-
consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf>  
57 Kristina Rozan, ‘How Do Industry Standards for Data Security Match Up with the FTC's Implied 
"Reasonable" Standards—And What Might This Mean for Liability Avoidance?’ (2014) The Privacy Advisor 
<https://iapp.org/news/a/how-do-industry-standards-for-data-security-match-up-with-the-ftcs-implied-
reasonable-standards-and-what-might-this-mean-for-liability-avoidance> 
58 Ibid. 
59 Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy’ (2014) 114(3) 
Columbia Law Review 628. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid 629. 
62 See for example FTC v. Geocities, FTC File No. 9823015, Agreement Containing Consent Order (Aug. 1998) 
and FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Stipulated Consent Agreement and Final Order, Civil Action No. 000032 
(D.D.C. Jan. 2000) (FTC File No. 002-3046) discussed in D. Reed Freeman, Jr and Elisa A. Nemiroff, ‘Privacy 
Law: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Headed in 2002 and Beyond?’ (2001-2002) 16 Antitrust 26.  
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Although many of these ‘broken promises’ concerning privacy are expressly stated in company 
documents such as privacy statements, the Commission also regulates promises made implicitly by 
the company.63 For example, in In re Google Inc. the company’s failure to respect consumers’ 
existing privacy settings was found by the Commission to be a deceptive act, based on the implicit 
promise that Google would comply with those settings.64 A company which makes vague promises as 
to data security and privacy may also be the subject of a FTC deception action.65  
Many FTC consent orders have considered what constitutes sufficient disclosure in respect of the 
collection and use of private consumer information. Although these consent orders only bind the 
intended parties and do not serve as a legal precedent, they do provide an insight into the expanding 
nature of FTC disclosure and consent requirements with regards to the collection and use of 
consumers’ personal information.  
Requirements for a Privacy Statement 
In the 1999 matter of Geocities, a corporation, the Commission brought an action against an operator 
of an online community for making false and misleading representations to its consumers through the 
use of an inadequate privacy statement which failed to disclose its practice of retaining, marketing, 
and selling consumers’ personal information to third parties.66 In its decision, the Commission put 
forward a non-exclusive list of disclosures which should be included in a privacy statement. This list 
included the information collected, its proposed use, and whether it would be shared with third 
parties.67 Additionally, the company was to disclose the means by which a consumer could access and 
remove such information from the company’s databases, as well as the process for deleting ‘personal 
identifying data’ from the company’s database and any limitations to such a deletion process.68 
The Commission also required that adequate notice as to the company’s data security policy appear on 
the website’s home page and every data-collection location.69 On the home page, there was required 
to be a ‘clear and prominent hyperlink or button labelled PRIVACY NOTICE…which directly links 
to the privacy notice screen(s).’70 The necessary disclosures had to be displayed ‘clearly and 
prominently’ within the privacy statement and there had to be a button for the consumer to press in 
order to make the privacy notice screen disappear. Additionally, a ‘clear and prominent hyperlink’ 
was required at every location where personal identifying data was to be collected which linked 
directly to the privacy notice screen and was to be accompanied by the following statement, written in 
bold: ‘NOTICE: We collect personal information on this site. To learn more about how we use 
your information click here.’71 
Ongoing Disclosure  
The matter of Sears Holdings Management Corporations, settled in 2009, demonstrates the FTC’s 
commitment to raising consumer awareness about deceptive data collection.72 The Commission 
alleged that Sears created an online service for consumers which required the downloading of a 
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67 In the Matter of GeoCities, a corporation, FTC File No. 9823015, Decision and Order (Feb. 1999) 
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software application that tracked almost all of the user’s online behaviour and internet traffic.73 This 
information was then presumably sold to third party data brokers.74 There were a number of online 
steps that the consumer needed to take before installing the application, and the software application 
was not mentioned at every step.75 An invitation message to those interested in the service stated that 
research software would track the user’s ‘online browsing’ but did not specify the full extent of the 
tracking.76 Sears’ ‘Privacy Statement and User License Agreement’, which consumers had access to 
later in the joining process, had a more detailed description of the online and offline information 
gathered but this information was hidden deep in the 75th line of the statement.77 The scope of the 
tracking was also not stated in detail at the installation stage. The fact that the application was running 
was not made obvious to consumers as there was no icon visible on the user’s desktop or systems 
tray.78 The Commission alleged that Sears’ practices were deceptive under section 5 of the FTC Act 
as initial communications had failed to adequately disclose the extent of information that the software 
application would collect when installed, facts that ‘would be material to consumers in deciding to 
install the software’.79  
 
The final settlement required that Sears disclose adequate information about the tracking application 
to the consumer and obtain the consumer’s express consent prior to the consumer downloading or 
installing it. Sears was compelled to disclose all of the kinds of data that the application would record, 
transmit and monitor, including but not restricted to, whether the data would be gleaned from the 
consumer’s use of specific websites or from their broader internet usage, whether the online 
information would include data obtained from consumer interactions with third parties in secure 
sessions, shopping basket transactions, online accounts or application forms and whether the data 
would encompass private health or financial information.80 Additionally, Sears was to disclose how 
the online information would be used by the company and whether it would be shared with a third 
party.81 This disclosure was to be made ‘clearly and prominently, and prior to the display of, and on a 
separate screen from, any final “end user license agreement,” “privacy policy,” “terms of use” page, 
or similar document.’82  
 
Furthermore, the FTC set down requirements to ensure that disclosure was ‘clear and prominent’ in 
terms of both presentation and content. For disclosures to be ‘clear and prominent’ they must be 
‘unavoidable’ and ‘of a type, size, and location sufficiently noticeable for an ordinary consumer to 
read and comprehend them, in print that contrasts with the background on which they appear.’83 
Additionally, the disclosure must be comprehensible, in an ‘understandable language and syntax, and 
with nothing contrary to, inconsistent with, or in mitigation of the disclosures.’84 
 
                                                            
73 In the matter of Sears Holdings Management, a corporation; FTC File No. 082 3099, Complaint (June 2009) 
< https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/082-3099/sears-holdings-management-corporation-
corporation-matter>; Hans, above n 40, 174.  
74 Ibid.  
75 In the matter of Sears Holdings Management, a corporation; FTC File No. 082 3099, Complaint (June 2009) 
< https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/082-3099/sears-holdings-management-corporation-
corporation-matter> 
76 Ibid. 
77 Hans, above n 40, 174. 
78 In the matter of Sears Holdings Management, a corporation; FTC File No. 082 3099, Complaint (June 2009) 
< https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/082-3099/sears-holdings-management-corporation-
corporation-matter>. 
79 Ibid. 
80 In the matter of Sears Holdings Management, a corporation, FTC File No. 082 3099, Decision and Order 
(Sept. 2009) < https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/082-3099/sears-holdings-management-
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The FTC also made clear that the express consent of the consumer was required for the installation of 
data tracking software and the collection of information. A recommended means of obtaining this 
consent was to have the consumer click on a button that was not pre-selected as a default and clearly 
marked as the means by which the tracking process was initiated.85 
 
Information Use in Excess of the Privacy Policy 
In 2012, Facebook settled with the FTC with respect to a number of alleged deceptive and unfair acts, 
including collecting and divulging information to third parties and/or the public which it had 
represented as being subject to user restrictions, and in one count, overriding users’ restrictions 
retroactively.86 As part of its settlement with Facebook, the FTC ordered that prior to sharing any 
private user information with a third party which ‘materially’ exceeded the privacy settings that were 
in effect for the user, Facebook would both ‘clearly and prominently disclose’ the proposed sharing 
arrangement to the user and obtain the ‘affirmative express consent of the user’.87 Specifically, 
Facebook was required to disclose to the user the kinds of private information that it intended to share 
with third parties, the third parties’ identities or the specific categories they fitted into, and that the 
proposed sharing arrangement would exceed the private settings that the user had specified for their 
account.88 Furthermore, the disclosure of any proposed sharing arrangements was required to be 
‘separate and apart from any “privacy policy,” “data use policy,” “statements of rights and 
responsibilities” page, or other similar document’.89 
In the matters of Geocities, Sears Holdings and Facebook, the FTC appears to have signalled to 
businesses that the consumer’s informed consent is required prior to any collection or sharing of 
personal data. As such, companies that use overly complex or vague terms in their disclosure, bury 
their disclosure in their privacy statement, fail to respect users’ choices regarding their privacy 
settings, or do not provide a means of obtaining express consent, may be exposed to litigation for 
undertaking deceptive acts or practices.   
C  Unfair Acts or Practices 
Although the FTC has traditionally tended to use ‘deception’ as the basis of its investigations, it is 
increasingly using its power to prevent ‘unfair acts or practices’ as a means of countering online 
actions that stand outside the specificity of ‘deception’. The FTC’s test for ‘unfairness’ was first 
expressed in the 1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness and later codified into the FTC Act in 1994 as 
15 U.S.C. § 45(n).90  
 
An act or practice will be considered by the Commission to be unfair if: 
(1) ‘it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers  
(2) that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition and  
(3) that cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers’.91 
 
The initial factor in the three-limb test of unfairness, the likelihood of substantial injury, should be 
given the most weight of all the limbs.92 In order to meet this test, the injury must be substantial; the 
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FTC ‘is not concerned with trivial or merely speculative harms’.93 This factor will typically be 
satisfied by financial harm, or an unnecessary risk to health or safety, however it may be sufficient to 
show that a large number of consumers each suffered a small amount of harm.94 Emotional harm, and 
other forms of ‘subjective’ harm, will not ordinarily be considered a ‘substantial injury’ which will 
render a practice unfair.95 For example, the Commission does not purport to ban certain 
advertisements on the basis that their content may offend some viewers.96 
The second limb of the unfairness test requires that ‘the injury must not be outweighed by any 
offsetting consumer or competitive benefits that the sales practice also produces’.97 The Commission 
recognises that the provision or omission of product information involves balancing the costs and 
benefits to sellers and consumers. For example, a seller’s decision to limit the amount of technical 
information that they provide to the consumer may reduce the consumer’s ability to make an informed 
purchase, however it also lessens the price of the product.98 The Commission also has regard to ‘the 
costs to the parties directly before the agency, but also the burdens on society in general in the form of 
increased paperwork, increased regulatory burdens on the flow of information, reduced incentives to 
innovation and capital formation, and similar matters.’99 
Thirdly, the unfairness test requires that the injury could not have been reasonably avoided by 
consumers. It is the Commission’s expectation that the market is self-correcting and that consumers 
can be relied upon to make their own decisions effectively without regulatory assistance.100 The 
Commission will however step in when ‘certain types of sales techniques…prevent consumers from 
effectively making their own decisions.’101 
§45(n) of the FTC Act provides that ‘[i]n determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the 
Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other 
evidence.’102 In order to be considered by the FTC, a public policy must be ‘clear and well-
established.’103 This means that the policy should not be ‘ascertained from the general sense of the 
national values’, but rather stated in ‘formal sources such as statutes, judicial decisions, or the 
Constitution as interpreted by the Courts.’104 Additionally, the public policy must be widespread; it is 
insufficient if the established source is limited to a single Court or state decision.105 The existence of 
such statutes, cases, or other policies may either support the FTC’s view that an act or practice is 
unfair, or affirmatively allow the action, prompting the Commission to reconsider its preliminary 
assessment. It is important to note the qualification contained in §45(n) that ‘[s]uch public policy 
considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.’106 
 
The FTC has historically been rather restrained in pleading ‘unfairness’, however the use of this 
pleading is slowly increasing.107 The FTC has stated that unfairness actions are ‘brought, not to 
second-guess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller 
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behaviour that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer 
decision-making.’108 A review of the FTC’s actions reveals distinct forms of behaviour which 
constitute unfair trade practices: data collection and use which is deceitful and improper, unfair 
information security design and practices, and retroactive changes to privacy policies.109 
The FTC has stated that in the context of data security practices, ‘the FTC conducts its investigations 
with a focus on reasonableness- a company’s data security measures must be reasonable in light of the 
sensitivity and volume of consumer information it holds, the size and complexity of its data 
operations, and the cost of available tools to improve security and reduce vulnerabilities.’110 
Furthermore, the Commission has emphasised that ‘it does not require perfect security; reasonable 
and appropriate security is a continuous process of assessing and addressing risks; there is no one-
size-fits-all data security program; and that the mere fact that a breach occurred does not mean that a 
company has violated the law.’111 
The FTC has emphasised that in order for a company to have a reasonable data security program, it 
should:  
(1) [K]now what consumer information they have and what employees or third parties have 
access to it;  
(2) limit the information they collect and retain based on their legitimate business needs;  
(3) protect the information they maintain by assessing risks and implementing protections in 
certain key areas – physical security, electronic security, employee training, and oversight of 
service provides; 
(4) properly dispose of information that they no longer need; and  
(5) have a plan in place to respond to security incidents, should they occur.
112
  
The majority of the FTC’s data security cases have resulted in consent orders, however two 
companies, LabMD Inc. and Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, have 
mounted challenges to the FTC’s ability to bring the claims on the basis that ‘the FTC lacks authority 
to regulate companies’ data security practices under §5 of the FTC Act, and that the FTC has failed to 
provide fair notice of what constitutes reasonable data security standards.’113  
In the matter of LabMD, Inc, the FTC considered a company’s failure to implement adequate data 
security practices as constituting an ‘unfair practice’.114 LabMD, a clinical laboratory, was the 
recipient of sensitive personal information, including consumers’ financial and health information.115 
The Commission claimed that failures in LabMD’s security system led to the accidental sharing of 
approximately 9,300 patients’ private information on a public file-sharing network.116 LabMD filed a 
motion to dismiss the FTC complaint on the basis that it lacked authority to regulate the data security 
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procedures of companies under section 5 and that it failed to give adequate notice as to the meaning of 
‘reasonable data security standards’.117 The FTC subsequently made an order denying LabMD’s 
motion to dismiss.118  
On 13 November 2015, Chief Administrative Law Judge Chappell dismissed the FTC’s charge of 
unfair trade practice against LabMD on the basis that the Commission ‘failed to prove that the 
allegedly unreasonable conduct caused or was likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.’119 In 
his Initial Decision, Judge Chappell found that the FTC failed to prove that ‘the exposure or limited 
exposure of some LabMD documents in 2008 has caused, or is likely to cause, any substantial 
consumer injury (whether identity-theft-related harm or otherwise).’120 Furthermore, the Court held 
that ‘demonstrating actual or likely substantial consumer injury under Section 5(n) [of the FTC Act] 
requires proof of more than the hypothetical or theoretical harm that has been submitted by the 
government in this case.’121 On 24 November 2015, the FTC’s complaint council lodged an appeal of 
Judge Chappell’s Initial Decision with the full Federal Trade Commission. Whilst Judge Chappell’s 
decision is a blow to the FTC’s pursuit of LabMD, it is important to note for the purpose of this article 
that the Court’s dismissal of the charge of unfair trade practice was founded on findings of fact in this 
particular matter, rather than a denial of the FTC’s authority to regulate companies’ data security 
practices under §5 of the FTC Act. The matter is ongoing. 
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation’s computer network was the subject of hacker attack on three 
separate occasions, which led to losses in excess of $10.6 million dollars.122 The FTC brought an 
action against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation and a number of its subsidiaries, alleging, amongst 
other things, that its claim that it protected the personal information of customer by using ‘industry 
standard practices’ was untrue and deceptive, and that its failure to maintain a ‘reasonable and 
appropriate data security standards’ for the personal information of its consumers violated section 5 of 
the FTC Act.123 Specifically, the FTC alleged that WWC had ‘unreasonably and unnecessarily 
exposed consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and theft’ by: 
(1) ‘fail[ing] to use firewalls’; 
(2) ‘stor[ing] payment card information in clear readable text’; 
(3) ‘fail[ing] to implement adequate information security policies and procedures’ 
(4) ‘fail[ing] to remedy known security vulnerabilities’; 
(5) ‘us[ing] default user IDs and passwords’; 
(6) ‘not requir[ing] the use of complex passwords’; 
(7) ‘fail[ing] to adequately inventory computers’; 
(8) ‘fail[ing] to employ reasonable measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access to 
computer networks’; 
(9) ‘fail[ing] to following proper incident response procedures’; 
(10) ‘fail[ing] to adequately restrict third-party vendors’ access to Wyndham’s network’.124 
 
Based on the above alleged violations, the FTC requested that the US District Court for the District of 
New Jersey impose a permanent injunction and other orders as the Court saw fit.125 WWC filed a 
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motion to dismiss the FTC’s complaint on the basis that § 5 of the FTC Act did not provide the FTC 
with the authority to regulate unfairness with respect to data security, that the FTC had not provided 
‘fair notice’ as to what it considered to be ‘reasonable data security standards’, and that the security of 
card data was not governed by § 5 of the FTC Act. 126 
By denying Wydham’s motion to dismiss, the US District Court for the District of New Jersey upheld 
the FTC’s authority to bring an action against deceptive and unfair conduct in the context of data 
security.127 Additionally, it confirmed that the FTC had provided fair notice as to what constitutes 
unfairness with respect to data security practice and was not required to publish regulations before 
bringing an unfairness claim.128 WWC immediately filed a motion for interlocutory appeal to the 
Third Circuit on the questions of whether the FTC had the authority to bring an unfairness claim 
under § 5 and whether the formal promulgation of regulations was a necessary first step before 
bringing an unfairness claim.  
On August 25, 2015 the Third Circuit dismissed WWC’s interlocutory appeal, affirming the District 
Court’s decision that the FTC does have authority to regulate a company’s data security procedures by 
way of section 5 of the FTC Act, also holding that WWC was given fair notice as to the possible 
application of the Commission’s unfairness standard to its data security practices. Further, it held that 
the FTC adequately alleged that ‘substantial injury’ to consumers had occurred, as required under 
section 5.129 On 9 December 2015, Wyndham announced that it would settle the matter with the FTC, 
agreeing to set up a ‘comprehensive information security program’ designed to safeguard the security 
and integrity of cardholder data.130  
 
Clearly, the Commission considers issues of consumer privacy and data security to be within its 
power to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices under section 5 of the FTC Act, a view which at 
this stage appears to be supported by the Courts. Given the current lack of direct legal avenues for 
individuals affected by data breaches in Australia, the following section will consider the applicability 
of a similar consumer protection approach by way of the Australian Consumer Law.  
 
V PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY & CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW: 
AUSTRALIA 
 
In this Part we will consider how the three  general protections in the ACL, in relation to misleading 
conduct,  unconscionable conduct, and unfair terms respectively, can apply to specific situations 
involving online privacy and data protection. 
 
A  Misleading or Deceptive Acts or Practices 
This Part examines how well the prohibitions of misleading conduct and unconscionable conduct in 
the Australian Consumer Law capture online privacy and data security breaches that are harmful to 
consumers. The first general protection contained in s 18(1) of the ACL provides that: 
A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead of deceive. 
This prohibition does not substantively vary from s 52(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
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(TPA), and the State and Territory equivalents in their Fair Trading Acts (FTA). The only difference 
is that s 18 is directed at the conduct of persons generally rather than corporations. If the conduct 
concerns that of a corporation reliance will generally be placed on the ACL (Cth). If the conduct 
concerns that of natural persons, reliance will generally be placed on the ACL of the State or Territory 
in which the conduct occurred. 
In Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd, the majority, in a joint judgment stated: 
Where the persons in question are not identified individuals to whom a particular 
misrepresentation has been made or from whom a relevant fact, circumstance or 
proposal was withheld, but are members of a class to which the conduct in question 
was directed in a general sense, it is necessary to isolate by some criterion a 
representative member of that class. The inquiry thus is to be made with respect to 
this hypothetical individual why the misconception complained has arisen or is likely 
to arise if no injunctive relief be granted. In formulating this inquiry, the courts have 
had regard to what appears to be the outer limits of the purpose and scope of the 
statutory norm of conduct fixed by s 52.131 (citations omitted) 
Thus, where conduct is directed at the public, the class is first identified. Having identified the class, 
the effect of the conduct is assessed having regard to the reactions of the ‘hypothetical individual’ – 
the ordinary, reasonable member of the class, not those of persons whose reactions are ‘extreme or 
fanciful’.132  
The concept of ‘engaging in conduct’ in s 2(2) of the ACL divides conduct into two broad categories: 
‘doing any act’ and ‘refusing to do any act’. The statutory language used does not require the making 
of some representation. As Hayne J observed in Google Inc v ACCC, the focus must be on the 
statutory text which focuses on ‘conduct’ rather than ‘representations’.133 In many situations the 
respondent's silence will not occur in isolation. The relevant ‘conduct’ will consist of the whole 
factual matrix including actions, representations and omissions (silence) that, viewed as a whole, may 
be misleading. In cases such as these, the presence of the additional material, when combined with the 
silent party's failure to disclose, may render its conduct, viewed in its entirety, misleading or deceptive 
for the purpose of s 18 of the ACL.134 
Assuming that the definition of ‘conduct’ in s 2 of the ACL can be satisfied, it is then necessary to 
consider whether silence at issue in a particular case was misleading. In Miller & Associates 
Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Limited, different approaches were taken for 
determining whether the conduct at issue was misleading.135 One approach was to analyse whether the 
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conduct viewed as a whole, conveyed a representation which was misleading. Another approach was 
to analyse whether the circumstances gave rise to a ‘reasonable expectation’ that if some relevant fact 
existed, it would be disclosed to the person who claimed to have been misled.136 
In addition to the general protection for misleading conduct contained in s 18, the ACL contains 
specific protections for false or misleading representations  in relation to the supply of goods or 
services in s 29(1). Section 18 of the ACL is a general provision dealing with misleading conduct and 
only gives rise to civil liability. Section 29(1) is more specific in its terms and gives rise to criminal as 
well as civil liability. It   provides that: 
A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible 
supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the 
supply or use of goods or services: 
(a) make a false or misleading representation that goods are of a particular 
standard, quality, value, grade, composition, style or model or have a 
particular history or particular previous use; or 
(b) make a false or misleading representation that services are of a particular 
standard, quality, value or grade; or 
…  
(g) make a false or misleading representation that goods or services have 
sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses or 
benefits;  
The equivalent provision of the TPA was s 53(c) and the jurisprudence in relation to s 53(c) will apply 
in relation to s 29(1)(g).137 As for s 18 of the ACL, a representation can be made to identified 
individuals, or to members of a class or section of the public. Section 29 of the ACL applies to false 
or misleading representations. The term “false” in relation to s 53 of the TPA was construed to mean 
“contrary to fact”, and did not depend on the knowledge of the person making the representation. In 
Given v Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd, the representation consisted of an odometer reading of a motor 
vehicle displayed for sale in the defendant's second-hand car yard. The odometer showed a mileage of 
23,700 when, in fact, the vehicle had travelled approximately 69,012 miles. 
Franki J held in relation to s 53(a): 
I am satisfied that, if a representation is in fact not correct, it comes within the words 
of the section, even if it is not false to the knowledge of the person making the 
representation, and even if the person making the representation is a servant of the 
company of insufficient significance in the company for his knowledge, according to 
the ordinary principles of the Common Law, to be deemed to be the knowledge of the 
company.138 
                                                            
136 The genesis of the “reasonable expectation” approach is to be found in the judgment of Gummow J in 
Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31 at 41. 
137 See ACCC v Excite Mobile Pty Ltd (2013) ATPR  ¶42-437 (Mansfield J); ACCC v Harvey Norman Holdings 
Limited (2011) ATPR ¶42-384 (Collier J);  ACCC v GM Holden Ltd  [2008] FCA 1428 (18 September 2008);  
CPA Australia Ltd v Dunn  (2007) ATPR ¶42-205 (Weinberg J);  Osgaig Pty Ltd v Ajisen (Melbourne)Pty Ltd  
(2004) ATPR ¶42-036 (Weinberg J);  ACCC v Chen  (2003) ATPR ¶41-948 (Sackville J);  ACCC v Wizard 
Mortgage Corp Ltd  (2002) ATPR ¶41-903 (Merkel J);  Mark Foys Pty Ltd v TVSN (Pacific) Ltd  (2001) ATPR 
¶41-795 (Beaumont, Tamberlin and Emmett JJ);  ACCC v Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)  (1999) ATPR 
¶41-718 (Lindgren J); and Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v ACCC  (1999) ATPR ¶41-672 (Wilcox, 
Tamberlin and Sackville JJ). 
138 Given v C V Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1977) ATPR ¶40-029 at 17,386. Franki J placed reliance on the 
High Court's interpretation of “false” as meaning “contrary to fact” in s 234(d) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) in 
Sternberg v The Queen (1953) 8 CLR 646 and Davidson v Watson (1953) 28 ALJ 63 at 64. 
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The test for determining whether representations in relation to goods or services are “misleading” for 
the purposes of s 29(1) is the same as that adopted for determining whether conduct is misleading for 
the purposes of s 18(1) of the ACL. 
Whether a representation directed at identified persons is misleading will be dictated by the 
circumstances of each particular case, including the state of knowledge of the person to whom the 
representation is directed. The test is: would a reasonable person in the position of the representee, 
taking into account what they knew, have been misled by the representation.139 
Part II, Div 2, Subdiv D of the ASIC Act mirrors the ACL. It contains a broad general protection 
(s 12DA) against misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to financial services or financial 
products, the equivalent of s 18 of the ACL, and then contains more specific protections – first, the 
making of specific false or misleading representations in relation to financial services.140 
Section 12CC of the ASIC Act mirrors s 21 of the ACL and regulates unconscionable conduct in 
relation to the provision of financial products and financial services.  
B Misleading or Deceptive Acts or Practices Cases 
Misleading Statements concerning Data Protection Measures 
Where a corporation mispresents to consumers its data protection measures, that is plainly misleading 
or deceptive conduct and will contravene ss 18, 29(1)(a),(b) and/or 29(1)(g). It will constitute false or 
misleading representation that the goods or services are of a particular standard or quality and had 
certain performance characteristics. Misleading statements concerning data protection measures 
would include: 
 falsely claiming to keep consumers’ information confidential or to keep consumer identities 
secret; 
 falsely claiming  that consumers’ information is securely encrypted and stored;  
 falsely claiming not to release confidential information to third parties.; and 
 falsely claiming that a corporation’s data security practices exceed or surpass industry 
security standards.  
Representations Regarding the Use of Industry Standard Practices 
The protection of software and hardware from unauthorised access or disclosure generally requires 
businesses to ensure that sensitive information is encrypted during transmission and storage. In some 
cases representations concerning data security claims are made by representors who know that the 
representations cannot be supported, and who also know that the target audience will not be able to 
check the accuracy of the claim because of the information asymmetry between the maker of the 
representation and the audience. In cases involving information asymmetry, or where representors 
hold themselves out as having specialist knowledge or expertise, the Court may find that a reasonable 
member of the target audience may conclude that the representation conveyed not merely that the 
maker believed the claim, but also that there were reasonable grounds for that belief, or, in the case of 
scientific or medical claims, that there was an adequate scientific or medical basis for the claim. If 
there is no adequate basis to substantiate the claim it will be found to be misleading.  
                                                            
139 Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592 at [50]. 
140 ASIC Act, s 12DB(1). 
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In ACCC v Breast Check Pty Ltd,141 Breast Check published promotional pamphlets stating that its 
thermography devices for conducting breast imaging could be used for assessing whether a customer 
was at risk from breast cancer and the level of that risk. The ACCC also alleged that Breast Check’s 
claim contained a representation that there was an adequate scientific basis for using the 
thermography devices as a substitute for mammography. It was held that Breast Check had 
contravened s 53(c) of the TPA and s 29(1)(g) of the ACL. Barker J found: 
In the context of a representation of a medical nature … it would be entirely reasonable for a 
consumer to conclude that, where a service of a medical nature is being provided, there would 
be scientific medical evidence of a sufficient quality to support the use of the equipment used 
to provide such a service and that the use of breast imaging devices would not be promoted in 
a way as to be contrary to the state of scientific medical knowledge.142  
What constitutes an “adequate” basis was considered by Barker J who stated: 
 
As to the question of the representation conveying that there is an adequate scientific or 
medical basis, I accept the submission made on behalf of ACCC that the word “adequate” 
should be taken in the sense by which it is generally understood. In the medical context that is 
that the service is provided according to evidence based medical knowledge and that there is 
sufficient support in medical science for the use of the devices for the purposes represented. 
This is particularly so in the context of assessing whether or not a person may have or be at 
risk of breast cancer, which is clearly a question of medical science.143  
 
Upon examining the above cases, it is submitted that if the facts in FTC v Wyndham arose in Australia 
and false representations were made by a corporation that it protected the personal information of 
customers by using ‘industry standard practices’, the conduct would give rise to contraventions of ss 
18 and /or 29(1)(g) of the ACL, or ss 12DA and/or 12DB(1) of the ASIC Act. 
 
Obtaining Personal Information without Consent 
 
The FTC’s ‘theory of deception’, applying where personal information is obtained without consent, is 
potentially important in the Australian context. A corporation that makes promises implicitly and a 
corporation which makes vague promises as to data security and privacy may also be the subject of a 
misleading conduct action. Deliberate failure to disclose adequate information about software 
applications that track consumers’ online behaviour and internet traffic is likely to contravene s 18 of 
the ACL. Silence through inadvertence does not invoke these provisions; the relevant refusing or 
refraining must be engaged in deliberately.144 Where a corporation engages in conduct that involves 
silence, and it is necessary to establish that the corporation deliberately failed to disclose within the 
definition of conduct in s 2(2)(c) of the ACL, s 139B(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth) must be considered. Section 139B(1) provides that if in a proceeding under the ACL in respect 
of conduct engaged in by a body corporate, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the body 
corporate, it is sufficient to show (a) ‘that a director, employee or agent of that body corporate 
engaged in that conduct within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the director, employee 
or agent’; and (b) ‘that the director, employee or agent had that state of mind.’ 
                                                            
141 ACCC v Breast Check Pty Ltd (2014) ATPR ¶42-479. 
142 Ibid at [141]. 
143 Ibid at [139]. There is a line of authority that supports this approach. See Global Sportsman v Mirror 
Newspapers (1984) 2 FCR 82 at 88 (Bowen CJ, Lockhart and Fitzgerald JJ); James v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd  (1986) 64 ALR 347 at 372 (Toohey J); Wright v Wheeler Grace & Pierucci Pty 
Ltd  (1988) ATPR ¶40-865 at 49,375-49,376 (French J); affirmed in  Wheeler Grace & Pierucci Pty Ltd v 
Wright  (1989) 16 IPR 189; Bateman v Slayter  (1987) 71 ALR 553 at 559 (Burchett J); and Thompson v Ice 
Creameries of Australia Pty Ltd  (1998) ATPR ¶41-611 at 40,693 (Lehane J). Cf Forrest v ASIC (2012) 247 
CLR 486, 525 [103] (Heydon J). 
144 Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 477. 
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Assuming that the definition of ‘conduct’ in s 2 of the ACL can be satisfied, it is then necessary to 
consider whether silence at issue in a particular case was misleading in accordance with the 
reasonable expectations test considered in  Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW 
Australia Finance Limited.145 In that case French CJ and Kiefel J observed: 
 
Reasonable expectation analysis is unnecessary in the case of a false representation where the 
undisclosed fact is the falsity of the representation. A party to precontractual negotiations who 
provides to another party a document containing a false representation which is not 
disclaimed will, in all probability, have engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct. When a 
document contains a statement that is true, non-disclosure of an important qualifying fact will 
be misleading or deceptive if the recipient would be misled, absent such disclosure, into 
believing that the statement was complete.146 
The ‘reasonable expectation’ test is predicated on the assumption that one party is aware of an 
undisclosed fact and the circumstances and context of the case give rise to an objectively reasonable 
expectation on the part of the other party that the fact should be disclosed because it would be relevant 
or material in its decision-making. The reasonableness of the alleged expectation is to be assessed 
objectively, and not by reference to the subjective expectation of the other party to the transaction.147 
If the facts in the matter of Sears Holdings Management Corporations were to arise in Australia they 
may give rise to contraventions of ss 18 and /or 29(1)(g) of the ACL, or ss 12DA and/or 12DB(1) of 
the ASIC Act. Sears’ initial communications failed to disclose adequately the extent of information 
that the software application would collect when installed. In an Australian context, the scope of the 
tracking would be material to consumers in deciding whether to consent to the installation of the 
software and give rise to an objectively reasonable expectation of full disclosure on the part of 
consumers prior to installation. 
 
C  Unconscionable Conduct 
The second general protection of the ACL which may catch online privacy and data security breaches 
is contained in s 21(1) which provides that: 
A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with: 
(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person (other than a listed 
public company); or 
(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from a person (other 
than a listed public company); 
engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. 
Section 21(1) is designed to protect persons generally, including ‘business consumers’ and ‘business 
suppliers’ from unconscionable conduct by persons occupying more powerful positions. There are no 
limits on the kind of businesses that might seek to rely on s 21(1); the only limitations are that the 
goods or services supplied or acquired must be supplied or acquired for the purpose of trade or 
commerce and the conduct must not be directed towards a publicly listed company.  
In Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, the Court had to decide whether the late 
payment fee charged the ANZ bank on credit card accounts was a penalty or otherwise 
unconscionable for the purposes of the prohibition of statutory unconscionable conduct in s 12CB of 
the ASIC Act. The Full Federal Court held that the charging of the late payment fees by ANZ was not 
                                                            
145 Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Limited (2010) 241 CLR 357. 
146 Ibid at [23]. 
147 Ibid at [20]. 
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unconscionable.  Allsop CJ said: 
 
More specific guidance to the meaning and operation of s 12CB as a consumer provision is 
given by the matters set out in s 12CC …to which a court may have regard for the purposes of 
considering the question of unconscionable conduct. These matters assist in setting a 
framework for the values that lie behind the notion of the relevant conscience of the parties in 
trade or commerce identified in s 12CB. Those values and conceptions can be seen as: 
fairness and equality: see paras (a), (b), (d) – (k); a lack of understanding or ignorance of a 
party: para (c); the risk and worth of the bargain: paras (e) and (i); and good faith and fair 
dealing: para (l).148  
Allsop CJ stated that in applying s 12CB of the ASIC Act, what is required is: 
 
…an evaluation of business behaviour (conduct in trade or commerce) as to whether it 
warrants the characterisation of unconscionable, in the light of the values and norms 
recognised by the statute. The task is not limited to finding “moral obloquy”; such may only 
divert the normative inquiry from that required by the statute, to another, not tied to the words 
of the statute. 149 
 
Allsop CJ concluded: 
In all the circumstances, in particular, the lack of any proven predation on the weak or poor, 
the lack of real vulnerability requiring protection, the lack of financial or personal compulsion 
or pressure to enter or maintain accounts, the clarity of disclosure, the lack of secrecy, 
trickery or dishonesty, and the ability of people to avoid the fees or terminate the accounts, I 
do not consider the conduct of ANZ to have been unconscionable. To do so would require the 
court to be a price regulator in banking business in connection with otherwise honestly carried 
on business in which high fees were extracted from customers.150 
 
The High Court was unanimous in dismissing the appeal that the Full Federal Court erred in 
determining that the charging of the late payment fees by ANZ was not unconscionable.151 Two 
members of the High Court, Keane J and Gageler J, discussed statutory unconscionability. They did 
not depart from the analysis of Allsop CJ.  
Keane J (with whom French CJ and Kiefel J agreed) gave the following reasons. First, late payment 
fees on credit cards were an established practice by all participants in the market, and the appellants 
had not argued that ‘…the market itself is unlawfully skewed’.152 Secondly, there was no suggestion 
that Mr Paciocco was forced to incur the late payment fees as a result of poverty or financial 
difficulties. Rather, ‘…Mr Paciocco chose to pay late, and thereby incur the late payment fee, as a 
matter of his own convenience’.153 Thirdly, the existence of a disparity in bargaining power alone is 
not enough to attract the operation statutory unconscionability. Rather, attention must focus on the 
manner of its exercise.154  
                                                            
148 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2015] FCAFC 50 at [285]. 
149 Ibid at [304]-[305]. 
150 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 199 at 283 [347]. 
151 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2016] HCA 28. 
152 Ibid at [290]. 
153 Ibid at [290]. 
154 Ibid at [293] and [294]. 
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Gageler J adopted the view that statutory unconscionable conduct is to be determined objectively and 
requires a ‘high level of moral obloquy’ on the part of the person said to have acted 
unconscionably.155 His Honour concluded: 
The existence and amount of the late payment fee were disclosed to Mr Paciocco in the 
letters, booklets and telephone calls which he received from ANZ.  He was able to, and did, 
understand them.  There has never been any suggestion of undue influence or pressure having 
been exerted on him or of unfair tactics having been used against him.  Mr Paciocco freely 
chose to enter into the two credit card contracts with ANZ and could have terminated those 
contracts at any time at will.  He could at any time have sought to obtain a credit card from 
another bank.  Other banks were in fact charging broadly equivalent fees.  Mr Paciocco chose 
instead to maintain his accounts with ANZ, to manage those accounts at close to their limits 
and to bear the risk of being charged the late payment fee on those occasions when he failed 
to comply with the standard stipulation to make the minimum monthly payment by the due 
date.156 
Obtaining Personal Information without Consent 
If the facts in the matter of Sears Holdings Management Corporations were to arise in Australia they 
could give rise to a contravention of s 21 of the ACL. A number of the statutory factors in s 22(1) of 
the ACL may be taken in to account by the Court. First, in relation to s 22(1)(a) – the relative 
strengths of the bargaining positions of the supplier and the customer – the customer whose personal 
information is being collected is likely to be in a weak and vulnerable position arising from the 
information asymmetry as between the corporation and the customer. Secondly, in relation to s 
22(1)(i) – the extent to which the supplier unreasonably failed to disclose to the customer any 
intended conduct of the supplier that might affect the interests of the customer – if the corporation 
requires consumers to download a software application that tracks their online behaviour and internet 
traffic, and the corporation fails to disclose that it on-sells that information to third party data brokers, 
this may constitute statutory unconscionable conduct. Arguably, the conduct would be contrary to fair 
dealing and conscience, and would involve a degree of moral tainting as a form of dishonest trickery 
or sharp practice. 
D Unfair Terms 
The third general protection relates to unfair terms in standard form consumer contracts and small 
business contracts. These are regulated by Part 2-3 of the ACL. The principal operative provisions 
relating to unfair terms are s 23(1) and (2) of the ACL which provide: 
(1) A term of a consumer contract or small business contract is void if: 
(a) the term is unfair; and 
(b) the contract is a standard form contract. 
(2) The contract continues to bind the parties if it is capable of operating without 
the unfair term. 
The supply is not required to be from a person “in trade or commerce”. However, the contract must be 
a standard form consumer or small business contract that contains an unfair term. 
                                                            
155 Ibid at [188] applying Attorney-General (NSW) v World Best Holdings Ltd  (2005) 63 NSWLR 557 at 583 
[121] (Spigelman CJ); CIT Credit Pty Ltd v Keable  [2006] NSWCA 130 (Spigelman CJ, with whom Giles JA 
and Gzell J agreed). 
156 Ibid at [190] 
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The test of what is “unfair” falls into four parts. The Court must consider the term at issue itself;157 
contextual matters surrounding the formation of the contract containing the term;158 whether the term 
was transparent;159 and the term at issue in the context of the contract as a whole.160 In determining 
whether each of the elements of unfairness is satisfied, the Court obtains guidance from the indicative 
“grey” list in s 25 of the ACL. Section 25 provides non-exhaustive examples of the kinds of terms that 
may, depending on the particular circumstances, be unfair. The purpose of the grey list is to provide 
statutory guidance as to the terms that may be of concern; it does not create a presumption that those 
terms are unfair. 
 
Section 25(g) provides the following example of a term which may be unfair: 
a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party unilaterally to vary the 
characteristics of the goods or services to be supplied, or the interest in land to be sold 
or granted, under the contract. 
 
An example of such a term in the context of privacy and data security breaches is one that allows for 
retroactive changes to privacy policies. 
 
Another example of a potentially unfair term is one that “limits, or has the effect of limiting, one 
party’s right to sue another”.161 Such a term may attempt to compel the consumer to have any dispute 
arising from a privacy or data security breach decided by a private arbitrator, or expressly prohibit the 
consumer from participating in a class action.  
VI PRIVATE AND PUBLIC REMEDIES UNDER THE ACL FOR MISLEADING 
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY CLAIMS 
A contravention of the consumer protection provisions in the ACL can be pursued in two ways. First, 
by means of private enforcement by persons who have suffered loss or damage caused by the conduct 
that contravenes the ACL; and secondly, by means of public enforcement by the ACCC.  
A Private Actions 
                                                            
157 ACL, s 24(1). 
158 ACL, s 24(2). 
159 ACL, s 24(2)(a). 
160 ACL, s 24(2)(b). 
161 ACL, s 25(k). 
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 Consumers who suffer loss or damage as a result of the misleading privacy and data security claims 
may bring private actions for damages,162 compensation orders,163 and/or an injunction.164 If 
consumers become aware of breaches they may not have a sufficient incentive to bring private 
actions. There are a number of reasons why an individual consumer may  not have a sufficient 
incentive to bring a private action. First, as explained in Part V above, the application of the ACL to 
online privacy or data security breaches is not clear-cut in some circumstances. Secondly, in private 
actions for damages the onus is on the consumer to prove a breach of the ACL on the balance of 
probabilities. The adversarial nature of the legal system provides little incentive for an individual 
consumer to take on the might of a large corporation that is prepared to devote significant financial 
resources to defend the action. If the consumer is successful on the issue of liability, the consumer 
must quantify the loss or damage suffered. Damages are not easy to measure for a breach of privacy. 
Are damages available for anxiety or stress in an action for a contravention of ss 18 or 21 of the ACL? 
Finally, the consumer must prove individual reliance on the misleading or unconscionable conduct of 
the respondent. Section 236 of the ACL only entitles a consumer to damages if the consumer can 
prove by objective evidence, rather than self-serving assertion, that the consumer relied on the 
misleading or unconscionable conduct of the respondent.165 This may prove difficult in practice. 
Where the loss or damage was partly the fault of the consumer in failing to take reasonable care, s 
137B of the CCA provides for a contributory fault defence for damages under s 236 of the ACL. 
There are also proportionate liability provisions in Pt VIA of the CCA that apply in respect of a claim 
for damages under s 236 of the ACL. Section 87CD(1)(a) of the CCA requires the Court to apportion 
the liability of a defendant who is a “concurrent wrongdoer”,166 on the basis of what it considers “just” 
having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the damage or loss. Thus, in the case 
of loss or damage arising from computer hacking, there would be a prospect of apportionment to the 
primary wrongdoer (the hacker), which would reduce the loss or damage payable by the corporation 
storing the consumer’s personal data that was hacked. Finally, there are many practical difficulties 
with bringing private actions by consumers, not the least of which is the high cost of legal services  
and the risk of having to pay the defendant’s legal costs as well if the consumer is unsuccessful. 
One way of overcoming these difficulties is for a consumer, or group of consumers affected by a data 
breach, to obtain funding from a litigation funding company. Such companies provide funds and 
manage disputes on behalf of their clients in return for a share of the damages awarded. They also 
agree to pay the costs of the defendant in the event of an adverse costs order.  
 
Class actions may be another means of overcoming these practical difficulties. The class action is a 
device for offsetting the high cost of legal services. If numerous consumers suffer the same injury as a 
result of a privacy breach or data security breach, but the loss or damage suffered by each of them is 
not sufficient to justify bringing separate proceedings, one or more may bring proceedings on behalf 
of the entire class of injured consumers. For example, representative proceedings can be brought 
under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA).167 Section 33C(1) of the FCA 
allows a representative proceeding to be commenced where the claims of the persons who are 
proposed as members of a group arose out of “the same, similar or related circumstances”. Pt IVA 
                                                            
162 ACL, s 236. 
163 ACL, s 237. 
164 ACL, s 232. 
165 See Access to Justice Arrangements, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No. 72, 5 September 2014 
which identifies a range of access to justice problems under Australia’s civil justice system. 
166 This is defined in s 87CB(3) of the CCA as one of two or more persons whose “acts or omissions (or act or 
omission) caused, independently of each other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim”. It 
is irrelevant that a wrongdoer is insolvent, being wound up or has ceased to exist or died. This has the potential 
to disadvantage consumers where one or more of the wrongdoers is insolvent or has ceased to exist. 
167 The history and purposes of Pt IVA are described by French J in Zhang de Yong v Milgea (1993) 118 ALR 
165 at 183. See Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts, Class Actions in Australia (2nd ed, Lawbook Co,, 
Sydney, 2012). 
25 
 
proceeds on the basis that the consent of a person to be a member of the group is not required.168 The 
Court must fix a date before which a group member may opt out of a representative proceeding.169 
Section 33Z of the FCA provides that the Court may in a representative proceeding determine issues 
of law and fact; make a declaration of liability; grant any equitable relief; make an award of damages 
for group members; and make such other order as the Court thinks just. 
B. Public Enforcement 
 In addition to private enforcement the ACL provides for public enforcement by the ACCC. This can 
be in the form of civil sanctions in relation to the contraventions of one or more the provisions of Chs 
2 or 3 of the ACL (other than s 18), or the imposition of criminal sanctions in relation to the offences 
contained in Ch 4 of the ACL. The civil prohibitions in ss 29(1)(a) and (g) and s 33 of the ACL are 
replicated in Chapter 4 of the ACL as criminal offences. Section 151 replicates s 29(1) and s 155 
replicates s 33. The ACCC has a broad authority to enforce the civil prohibitions and criminal 
offences in the ACL. The ACCC has two discretionary administrative powers which may be used in 
relation to privacy and data security claims, substantiation notices and infringement notices.  
 
Substantiation Notices 
Substantiation notices are likely to be used by the ACCC in relation to misleading privacy and data 
security claims where the ACCC cannot readily discern the truth or accuracy of the claim being made. 
A substantiation notice must be complied with within 21 days of the notice. Providing false or 
misleading information in a substantiation notice gives rise to civil and criminal liability. 
Section 222(1) provides that a person must not provide the regulator false or misleading information 
in compliance or purported compliance with a substantiation notice. 
Part 4-5 of the ACL sets out criminal offence provisions for failing to comply with a substantiation 
notice. Penalties for failing to comply with it within the substantiation notice compliance period are 
$16,500 for a body corporate, and $3,300 for a person who is not a body corporate. The ACCC also 
has extensive evidence gathering powers pursuant to s 155 of the CCA. For example, in the course of 
its investigation in ACCC v Safe Breast Imaging Pty Ltd,170 the company was required pursuant to s 
155 to provide details of the published clinical trials and scientific research into the efficacy of the 
MEM device for breast imaging in order to establish whether there was a reasonable scientific basis 
supporting the representations made.171 
Infringement Notices 
Infringement notices may be issued by the ACCC where it has formed the view that a person has 
contravened ss 29(1) and/ or 33 of the ACL. The ACCC is not required to give the company a written 
statement that sets out ACCC's reasons for believing that a contravention has occurred; or give a 
representative of the company an opportunity to make submissions, give evidence and appear at a 
private hearing before the ACCC; or detail the circumstances giving rise to ACCC's reasons to believe 
a contravention has occurred.  A failure to pay an infringement notice penalty may result in the ACCC 
commencing proceedings for the imposition of a criminal sanction or civil penalty.172 
Infringement notices cannot be issued for an alleged contravention of s 18 of the ACL, the general 
misleading or deceptive conduct provision, possibly for the same reason that pecuniary penalties 
cannot be imposed for a contravention of s 18.173 Because of its general nature it may involve 
breaches of the law that are unintentional and inadvertent, and it would be inappropriate to penalise 
                                                            
168 FCA, s33E. 
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170 ACCC v Safe Breast Imaging Pty Ltd (2014) ATPR ¶42-464. 
171 Ibid at [135]. 
172 See ACCC, Guidelines on the Use of Infringement Notices (issued on 16 October 2012) at [9]. 
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such conduct. If the ACCC has reasonable grounds for believing that a person has contravened an 
infringement notice provision within 12 months after the day on which the contravention is alleged to 
have occurred, the ACCC may issue an infringement notice. If the penalty is paid, the matter is closed 
without proceeding to court. 
Section 134(1) of the CCA provides that the issue of an infringement notice to a person for an alleged 
contravention is “… as an alternative to proceedings for an order under section 224 of the Australian 
Consumer Law”. Thus, the ACCC cannot issue an infringement notice and subsequently seek 
pecuniary penalties in relation to the same alleged contravention. Infringement notices carry penalties 
of $102,000 for ASX-listed corporations, $10,200 for bodies corporate other than listed corporations 
and $2,040 for individuals. 174 
Civil and Criminal Proceedings 
In more serious cases of misleading privacy and data security claims the ACCC may apply to the 
Court for the imposition of civil or criminal sanctions. The maximum civil pecuniary penalties that 
can be imposed for each contravention of the specific consumer protections provisions (not the 
general protection in s 18 of the ACL) are $1.1 million for a body corporate and $220,000 for persons 
other than bodies corporate.175 The matters to be taken into account by the Court in assessing an 
appropriate penalty are set out in s 224(2) of the ACL. Where natural persons are knowingly 
concerned in making false premium claims the ACCC will seek to make them liable as accessories 
pursuant to s 224(1)(e) of the ACL. 
In addition to pecuniary penalties, the Court can order any of the following: 
 declarations;176 
 injunctions to prevent the prohibited conduct from continuing or being repeated;177 
 non-punitive relief for non-party consumers;178 
 non-punitive relief orders, such as for the establishment of a compliance program and an 
order to publish corrective advertising to protect the public interest;179 
 orders disqualifying persons from managing a corporation for breaches of the specific 
consumer protection provisions;180 and 
 Court enforceable undertakings.181 
 
The ACCC cannot pursue all of the complaints it receives and must direct its enforcement resources 
to ensuring it obtains the greatest overall benefit for consumers.182 To date the ACCC has not sought 
to bring civil or criminal proceedings for online privacy or data security breaches. This may be 
because it has not received any complaints of that nature, or that, unlike the FTC, it gives these types 
of breaches very little priority. The enforcement of privacy rights in Australia is at a very early stage 
of its development, and given all of its other priorities, the ACCC may feel that these matters should 
be left to the specialist regulator in this area, the OAIC, or industry regulators such as the Australian 
Energy Regulator, which issued an infringement penalty in June 2014 against Lumo Energy for its 
failure to meet information security standards in breach of the National Electricity Rules.183  
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177 ACL, s 232. 
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However, claims made by corporations, especially those operating in an online environment, about 
the safe storage of data, and measures to ensure the protection of consumers’ confidential information 
are in the nature of premium claims. Premium claims have been an enforcement priority for the 
ACCC since 2013.184 Premium claims give the impression that a product or service has attributes, or 
some kind of added benefit when compared to similar products and services. They can be made as 
long as the claims are not misleading and can be substantiated.185 False premium claims about privacy 
protection and data security will difficult, or impossible for consumers to detect because of 
information asymmetries. By providing both public and private avenues of enforcement, the ACL has 
the potential to serve as a useful instrument in regulating online privacy and data security breaches 
against consumer.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The issue of online privacy and data security is very important for businesses and Australian society 
in general. The amount of consumers’ personal data that is being collected from websites is increasing 
exponentially. However, very little is known about the extent to which corporations in Australia are 
collecting data on their customers’ transactions and spending patterns, and the extent to which this 
data is being shared with others. Australia lags behind comparable developed countries in relation to 
data protection. International frameworks, such as the OECD Guidelines, have been in place since 
1980. In Australia, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), imposes some limited obligations and protections for 
consumers. It provides for penalties, but these penalties only apply to serious or repeated invasions of 
privacy. As digital practices such as data sharing and ecommerce becoming increasingly 
commonplace, it is imperative that Australia develop a strong legal framework for regulating cyber 
security. While the setting out specific legal obligations for businesses by way of the Privacy Act is an 
appropriate regulatory response to the problem of protecting privacy and data security, the broad, 
general protections of the Australian Consumer Law and ASIC Act also have a role to play in this area. 
Consumer protection laws seek to ensure that consumers make an informed choice when entering into 
particular transactions. They seek to ensure that consumer reasonable expectations regarding privacy 
and data security are met. Finally, they offer effective remedies in relation to privacy violations. 
 
 
                                                            
184 See ACCC Compliance and Enforcement Policy (February 2015), p 4. 
185 ACCC, False or misleading claims.  Available at: http://www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-promoting-
your-business/false-or-misleading-statements 
